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ABSTRACT
Using a two alternative signal detection procedure, 
subjective probability of reinforcement was scaled as a 
function of objective probability. Rats were trained in a 
discrete trial procedure to press a right hand lever if an 
overhead light produced 1.20 ft-ca illumination (correct 
detection) and the left lever if the light produced less 
illumination (correct rejection). A .02 cc dipper of water 
was programmed to occur probabilistically following correct 
responses. If a right lever press occurred with the lesser 
illumination (false alarm) or a left lever press occurred 
with greater illumination (miss), a 3 second time-out ensued 
and reinforcement was never delivered. The probability of 
reinforcement for correct detections and a complementary 
probability of reinforcement for correct rejections were 
varied in successive 5000 trial conditions while the rats 
were discriminating 1.20 ft-ca and 1.05 ft-ca illuminations; 
and again while the rats were discriminating 1.20 ft-ca and 
.66 ft-ca illuminations. The overall probability of re­
inforcement for correct responses was always .5: The prob­
ability of reinforcement for correct rejections relative 
to the probability of reinforcement for correct detections 
ranged from .1/. 9 to .9/.1.
The resultant relations between an index of response 
bias and the ratio of reinforcement probabilities for correct 
rejections over correct detections was plotted for the two
viii
discrimination conditions. The "bias index was a criterion 
likelihood ratio estimated from response frequencies using 
a signal detection analysis. The bias indices were power 
functions of the ratio of reinforcement probabilities. The 
exponents departed from 1.0, indicating that animals did not 
maximize the average total number of possible reinforcers in 
a session (maximize expected value). By assuming that 
animals adopted a strategy which maximized subjective expected 
utility, the bias index was used to define the subjective 
equivalent to an objective probability of reinforcement. 
Analysis of the results of this and other experiments in­
dicate that the bias index exhibited properties of an interval 
scale of amount and probability of reinforcement. Thus, sub­
jective probability, as defined by the bias index, has in­
terval scale properties.
Subjective probability was a power function of ob­
jective probability under either discrimination condition.
The exponents ransxed from .49 to 1.57 and for some animals 
tended to be smaller under less dlscriminable conditions. 
Reanalysis of the results of other detection experiments in 
which stimulus probability was varied revealed a similar 
pattern of results. Thus, there was an interaction between 
the bias index and discriminability of the stimuli con­
tradicting the assumption of signal detection analysis that 
animals adopt an optimum criterion. The interaction was 
neither large nor reliable across animals, suggesting that 
it could be eliminated by procedural refinement.
ix
In the final two conditions the probability of the 
more intense stimulus was reduced to .4 and finally the 
probability of reinforcement for correctly detecting that 
stimulus was reduced to .4. Response bias was better pre­
dicted using subjective probability than objective probabil 
ity. The findings of this and other experiments suggest 
that a signal detection procedure can be used to define sub 
jective probability as a unique interval level scale, and 





1.1 Purpose of the Research 
During the 18th century, Court mathematicians who ad­
vised gamblers among the court nobility were puzzled by a 
phenomenon which became known as the "St. Petersburg Para­
dox." An experienced gambler often adopted a strategy that 
did not maximize average long run payoff or the expected mon­
etary value of a gamble. For example, a gambler would typic­
ally choose a wager which would pay off $100 with a probabil­
ity of .9 over a wager which would pay off $1000 with a prob­
ability of .1, where in each case the loss of the wager led 
to a payoff of $0. Suppose we define a random variable, w, 
which denotes the monetary winnings (or if negative, the 
losses) on a gamble. The expected monetary value, E(w), of 
a gamble with two possible outcomes can be defined as follows:
E(w) = w1p(w1) + w 2p (w 2 ) (1.1.1)
where w are the different outcomes that may occur and 
p(w) are the probability of those occurrences. In our 
gambling example above, the expected monetary value of the 
$1000 bet is $100 where for the $100 bet the expected mon­
etary value is only $90. The gambler typically chose the 
$100 bet even though the $1000 bet had higher expected mon­
etary value. Bernoulli attempted to explain this paradox
2by suggesting that a gambler acted to maximize his expected 
utility rather than the expected value of a gamble.
Utility is a psychological continuum functionally re­
lated to but not necessarily eaual to the monetary value. For 
example, Bernoulli suggested that utility was a logarithmic 
function of monetary value. Such a mathematical transformation 
would account for the behavior of a gambler in the above ex­
ample. The $1000 waver was less than ten times the utility of 
the $100 waver. Later, Savage (1954) suggested that the sub­
jective probability estimate of an outcome may not equal the 
objective probability. Objective probability is the limiting 
relative frequency of an outcome over an infinite number of 
gambles; subjective probability is a psychological continuum 
which is a transformation of objective probability. If sub­
jective probability does not equal objective probability, then 
both the utility of an outcome and its subjective probability 
must be defined before choice behavior can be predicted. If 
subjective probability is consistent with the axioms of ob­
jective probability and the assumptions underlying expected 
utility theory are correct then equation 1.1.1 can be re­
written in terms of subjective continue (Savage, 1954).
E 1 [_u(w)”J = u ( w 1 )p'(wp) + u ( w 2 )p'(w2 ) (1.1.2)
where u and p 1 are algebraic transformations of the value of 
an outcome and the objective probability of an outcome, re­
spectively.
3Assuming that organisms chose alternatives in such a 
way as to maximize expected utility, Von Neumann and Morgen- 
stern (1947) developed a mathematical theory of utility which 
has been Incorporated into descriptive models of choice be­
havior (Shlmp, 1969; Tversky, 1967), psychophysical detection 
and discrimination performance (Green & Swets, 1966) and 
motivation (Rachlin, Green, Battalio, & Kagel, 1976).
The purpose of this research was to determine if a 
signal detection analysis, which is itself based on decision 
theory, can be used to scale subjective probability and 
utility. In the first of two experiments dealing with this 
topic (Whittaker, in prep), the method was used to attempt to 
scale delay of reinforcement into a utility dimension. The 
method is used here to scale probability of an outcome.
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1.2 Other Methods Used to Scale Utility or Probability 
Various lines of research have directly or indirectly 
led to the development of utility scaling procedures. In one 
of the earlier such experiments (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951), a 
subject was presented with gambles, constructed for possible 
hands of poker dice, that he could accept or reject. He won 
w^ cents if he beat the hand or would lose a nickel (i.e., 
w2 = -5) if he did not. By presenting the subjects with a 
variety of gambles, differing in payoff, W]_, and payoff prob­
ability, p(w1 ), the expected utility of the gamble,
was assumed to be zero at the indifference point where the sub­
ject accepted or rejected the gamble an equal number of times. 
By arbitrarily setting u(-5) = -1 and u(0) = 0, the authors 
then defined the utility of the payoff, w^, in terms of the ob­
jective probabilities which produced indifference. By assump­
tion,
(1.2.1)
p(w^)u(w1 ) + p(w2 ) . - 1 = 0 (1.2.2)
then
u(w]_) = p(w2 )/p(w1) . (1.2.3)
5The problem with this procedure is that two Independent var­
iables, outcome utility and the subjective probability of an 
outcome, contribute to the subjective expected utility of a 
gamble. Mosteller & Nogee assumed that subjective probability 
equalled objective probability, an assumption which has been 
questioned by Savage (1954). Probability must be scaled with 
an independent procedure, before utility of outcomes can be 
scaled in terms of probability. Other attempts to scale 
utility or subjective probability dealt with this problem.
Tversky (1967) used a choice procedure which offered a 
rather elegant solution. Subjects chose the minimum selling 
price of a gamble. Increases in the probability of winning 
and payoff of a gamble increased its selling price. Thus,
E' [u(w)J = u($) = p ' ( w 1 )u(w1 ) (1.2.4)
where u($) is the utility of the selling price, p'(wp) the sub­
jective probability of the outcome of the gamble and u(wp) the 
utility of the outcome. Since outcome and minimum selling 
price are functions of money, they should have the same util­
ity function. Tversky assumed a power function so that
©log $ = ©log Wp + p'(wi) (1.2.5)
and thus
log $ = log wp + l/© log p'(wp). (1.2.6)
Using; a two way analysis of variance, Tversky showed that w-^  
and p(w^) had additive effects on log; p 30 subjective proba-
T / q
bility, s(w^) , could be estimated as follows (the actual
computing; formula differs in detail):
P(wi)l/G = $/wx (1.2.7)
The subjective probability derived- for individuals was a power 
function of objective probability with an exponent close to 
1.0; very high probabilities were usually underestimated and 
very low probabilities usually overestimated.
Galanter (1962) used a direct estimation method de­
veloped by 3. S. Stevens (1959) where human subjects directly 
estimated seme physical quantity by assigning a number tc it. 
Galanter had subjects assign numbers which represented "twice 
the haprdness" produced by different amounts of money. Since 
the subjects arbitrarily chose different ranges of numbers 
to assign, data were normalized and then averaged across sub­
jects and functionally related to the objective amount of 
money. He then had the same subjects directly estimate the 
likelihood of different statements such as "the likelihood it 
will not rain in Philadelphia in April" and scaled these 
events using three other related procedures with similar es­
timates of subject probability obtained for each statement.
In order to verify these estimates, in a second experiment he 
used a choice procedure similar to Mosteller and Nogee's where 
subjects chose between hypothetical gambles such as:
7Gl: you win $1000 If it does not rain in Philadelphia 
in April
G2: you win $10 if the next person you meet had an 
appendectomy
Since the utility of each payoff and the subjective probability 
of each statement had been independently assessed, the sub­
jects' choices could be predicted, and were in reasonable agree­
ment with the data. Utility was found to be a power function 
of money; however, since the objective probability of the state­
ments were not defined, the subjective probability function 
could not be specified. Another experiment (Beach & Phillips, 
1967) had subjects estimate the objective probabilities of 
light illuminations and found that objective probabilities 
approximately matched subjective probabilities.
The experiments described above represent various pro­
cedures which could be used for measuring utility and subjective 
probability. The signal detection analysis is a direct scaling 
procedure in the sense that subjective expected utilities are 
inferred directly from the degree of preference in a choice 
situation. Because the analytical methods are derived from 
concepts of utility theory, they imply consistency with re­
sults of a choice procedure such as used by Mosteller & Nogee 
(1951) and Tversky (1967).
81.3 Signal Detection Paradigm 
In a signal detection procedure, a subject must dis­
criminate two stimulus conditions; differences in light inten­
sity, for example. Typically one stimulus is presented per 
discrete trial and one of two responses can be made. One 
response (Ri) is correct in the presence of one stimulus (S^) 
while the other response ( )  is correct in the presence of the 
other stimulus (S2 ). The two responses are usually defined on 
separate levers or keys in animal experiments. The responses 
can be defined as follows:
Rl R2
(signal) S1 correct detections miss
(no signal) S2 false alarms correct rejections




w ^  and w22 are favorable outcomes, where w12 and w2-^ are 
negative or null outcomes.
The dependent variables are the conditional probabilities 
estimated by the relative frequency of a response under stimulus 
condition S-^  or S2 : the probability of R^ given S^, denoted 
p(R^|S^) and the conditional probability of R^ given S2 , de­
noted p(Rx| S2). The remaining conditional probabilities of 
responding p(R2 |S-L) and p(R2Js2 ) are complements of p(R-jJs^) 
and p(Rx |s2 ) respectively. The latter two •conditional response
9probabilities are conventionally used in the signal detection 
analysis.
In this paradigm the physical stimuli (S^ & S2 ) and 
outcomes are independent determiners of particular probabilities 
of correct detections and false alarms. If S-^  and Sp are not 
clearly discriminable, increasing payoff for correct detections 
(wn ) relative to correct rejections (wp2 ) would likely produce 
an increase in both p(R^|S-^) and p(R^ S2 ). If the difference 
between and S0 is held constant and the values of w n  and 
w22 are varied, the resulting relationship between pdRiJS-^) and 
pCR-jJSj) is called a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curve. Specification of this function permits one to derive 
an index of sensitivity which is independent of biasing var­
iables (e.g., outcomes): similar isosensitivity functions have 
been found in experiments with human (e.g., Galanter & Holman, 
1967; Grier, 1971; Green & Swets, 1966; Swets, 1973; Swets, 
Markowitz & Franzem, 1969) and non-human subjects (Hobson,
1970; Hume, 1974; Hume & Irwin, 1974; Nevin, Olsen, Mandell & 
Yarensky, 1975; Schusterman & Barrett, 1975; Stubbs, 1976). A 
bias-independent index of sensitivity has been used to scale 
the effect of stimulus dimensions such as sound intensity and 
wavelength of light on the behavior of human (e.g., Green & 
Swets, 1966) and non-human subjects (Wright, 1972) with re­
markable agreement with other scaling methods.
The relation between p(R-^ |s1) and p(R-jJSp) when out­
comes are held constant and stimulus conditions are varied is 
called an isobias curve. Specification of the forms of the
10
function permits one to derive an index of response bias which 
may be independent of stimulus conditions but functionally re­
lated to outcomes. The form of the isobias functions has been 
less extensively studied (Terman & Terman, 1972; Hume & Irwin, 
1974; Hume, 1974) and the independence of the bias index from 
stimulus conditions remains questionable. The relationship 
between this bias index and a specification of outcomes such 
as reinforcement probability, could provide an alternative 
method for scaling the utility of an outcome and thus warrants 
further investigation. The analytical methods presented in 
Green & Swets (1966) in their theory of signal detectability, 
were developed from some basic assumptions of utility theory.
11
1.4 Signal Detection and Utility Theory 
In the theory of signal detectability, a particular 
stimulus condition may produce various sensory events: the 
sensory events associated with these stimuli are characterized 
as a single variable, x, which usually has a different value 
each time a stimulus condition is sampled. A unique dis­
tribution of x is associated with each stimulus condition.
Choose R]Choose R2
x x
These- distributions suggest that although a certain 
sensory event could occur during each stimulus condition, the 
probability of this sensory event differs if the stimulus con­
ditions are not the same, For example, the animal could be 
looking away from the light source when the bright light (S^) 
was presented with sensory event x-j_ produced (see fig. 1.4,1),
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Since x^ is more likely if the dim light (S2 ) occurs, one 
might say that the animal "saw" a dim light even though a 
brieht light was presented, and would most likely report that 
the dim light occurred (miss). Since a particular value of 
x can occur if either stimulus is presented, the subject bases 
his decision on a ratio of the likelihoods that some inform­
ation, x, occurs given a stimulus.
£ cb. = fSl(x) (1.4.1)
^ 0bt f ^ 7
In order to make a decision, the subjects set a stable criterion, 
JB-obtained, which equals a particular likelihood ratio and 
corresponds to a particular value of x (see the vertical lines 
in Fig. 1.4.1), If the likelihood ratio obtained on a trial 
exceeds the criterion, he chooses R-j_; if it does not, then he 
chooses R2. The criterion likelihood ratio indicated by the 
solid vertical line in Figure 1.4.1 equals 1 because the or­
dinate heights, fsi(x) and fg2(x ), of each distribution are 
equal. With the other criterion the likelihood ratio would be 
smaller than 1. So in the above example the animal would be 
more likely to choose if either S-^  or S2 occurred.
The criterion the animal adopted over a session of a 
few hundred trials can be estimated from p(correct detections) 
and p(false alarms). The area of distribution S-^ to the right 
of the criterion corresponds to p(correct detection); the prob­
ability x greater than the criterion would be produced if 
occurred. The area of distribution to the right of the
13
criterion corresponds to the p(false alarms), the probability 
that x greater than the criterion would be produced if S2 
occurred. By assuming these distributions to be normal and 
of equal variance, the z equivalent to x can be found in a 
table of z scores for the unit normal distribution. The 
formula for the unit normal distribution can be used to cal­
culate fg1(z) or fS2(z ) Hays and Winkler, 1971, P. 215). If 
both S^ and distributions also have equal variance then the 
likelihood ratio based on z scores is equivalent to the likeli­
hood ratio in equation 1.4.1 (Green & Swets, 1966, ch. 3; 
McNicol, 1972). The assumption of normal distribution of equal 
variance has been supported by experiments with pigeons (Hobson, 
1970; Stubbs, 1976), porpoises, sea lions (Schusterman &
Varrett, 1975), and rats (Hume, 1974; Hume & Irwin, 1974; Nevin, 
Olsen, Mandell & Yarensky, 1975; Terman & Terman, 1972) as well 
as humans (Green & Swets, 1966). The stimuli which the animals 
discriminated included: number of responses required for re­
inforcement, duration, presence of tone, noise Intensity and 
light Intensity.
The criterion, ^-obtained, is assumed to depend on the 
utilities of certain outcomes. If a correct detection produced 
an outcome of greater utility than a correct rejection, then 
the subject would adopt a criterion less than 1. Such a 
criterion would increase p(correct detections) and decrease 
p(correct rejections). An experiment by Hume (1974) nicely 
illustrates this point.
Rats were trained to discriminate two noise intensities
14
which were presented on separate trials. Pressing the right 
lever In the presence of the louder noise (correct detection), 
or the left lever in the presence of the less intense noise 
(correct rejection) produced reinforcing brain stimulation. 
Incorrect responses, right lever presses with a less Intense 
noise (false alarms) or left lever presses with a louder noise 
(miss) were followed by a 5 second time out. After the animals 
were trained, Hume varied the number of brain stimulations for 
correct detections and correct rejections. For example, in 
one condition, 3 stimulations were produced by a correct de­
tection and only 1 was produced by a correct rejection. The 
animals adopted a criterion less than 1 (e.g., J3 = l/7); this 
increased the p(correct detection) and p(false alarms) with a 
net decrease in number of correct responses in a session. 
However, since more brain stimulations were associated with 
correct detections, the number of brain stimulations obtained 
over a session was increased by the adoption of this criterion.
Let us assume for the moment that subjective and ob­
jective probabilities are equal and that the objective value 
of an outcome equals its subjective utility. If one further 
assumes the animal chooses according to a strategy which max­
imized expected value (and expected utility) then for a given 
set of outcomes and a priori piS-^), there is a unique criterion 
which the animal will adopt. The relationship between the 
criterion and expected value can be derived as follows:
E ( w 2 | x )  = w22 p(S2 |x) + wl2 p(S1jx)
k i (1.4.2)
E(w1fx) = wi;L p(S2 |x) + w21 p(S1|x)
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where p(w22) and p(w21) equals p(S2 |x), and p(w11) and p(w12) 
equals p(S-jJ x).
Expected value of alternative R2 , E(w2|x) is the sum 
of the products of the outcomes and their probability of 
occurrence given x. Likewise, the expected value of R^,
ECw^x) can be defined given the same information, x, obtained 
on a particular trial. The animal who maximizes expected value
will choose R2 if
E(w 2 |x ) > E(w^Jx) (1.4.3)
Otherwise, he should choose R^. Substituting the expressions 
for the expected values, we have
w22p(S2 jx) + w12p(S1|x) > w11p(S1 |x) + w21p(S2jx) (1.4.4)
and rearranging terms, we have
^ . (1.4.5)
W i i  - w12 p(s1 |x^
In equation 1.4.5 p(S^Jx) and p(S2|x) are unknown; however, 
using Bayes' theorem we find:
P ( S l l x ) =  P ^ l s i )  p ( s x ) „
plsjjxj p(x|S2T  * p(S2 )
substituting 1.4.6 into 1.4.5 we can specify the relation be­
tween the criterion, computed from response probabilities and 
the outcomes and p(S^)
p(x| S^ _) <1 p(Sg) • W22 - W21 (1.4.7)
P (x| S2 ) P(SX) w ^  - w-^ 2
Equation 1.4.7 implies that when p(x|S1 )/p(x|S2 ) ex­
ceeds a certain criterion ratio the animal will choose R^.
That criterion is JB-obtalned estimated from response proba­
bilities (see equation 1.4.1). Assuming the animals maximize 
expected value, the likelihood ratio, ^B-obtained, should equal 
the ratio of a priori stimulus probabilities times the ratio of 
outcome values,
f (x lsi) = P(Sg) • w22 ~ W21 (1.4.8)
f(x|S2 ) p(S1) wlx - w12
Given a certain set of outcomes and an a priori probability 
of stimulus presentation, the criterion, ^-obtained, should 
remain constant as S-^  and S2 become more or less discriminable.
Increasing the difference between S-^  and Sg (e.g., 
difference in light intensity) would change the probability of 
correct detections relative to false alarms; with no false 
alarms if the stimuli were perfectly discriminable and an 
equal number of false alarms and correct detections if they 
were indiscriminable. Increasing the discrimlnabillty of S-^
and S2 is represented in figure 1.4.1 as a greater difference
between the mean of the two distributions. The relative
17
probability of correct detections and false alarms will change, 
however, if the animal's choice behavior is consistent with 
eouation 1.4.8 and the hypothesis that it maximizes expected 
value, ^-obtained should not change. Furthermore, an animal's 
criterion should be predicted under different stimulus con­
ditions from the a priori probability of a stimulus occurrence 
and a measure of the value of the outcomes.
The application of utility theory to the signal de­
tection situation leads to the predictions that an animal's 
criterion, ^-obtained, should be determined by the a priori 
probability of a stimulus occurrence and a measure of the 
relative values of the outcomes accordin'? to eouation 1.4.8. 
Moreover, the value of ^-obtained and the relation between 
^-obtained and J3-ortimum should not be affected by changes in 
the stimulus condition because there is no -parameter representing 
discriminability in eouation 1.4.8. These two predictions can 
be examined with the results of other signal detection ex­
periments where the relation between ^ B-obtained and ^-optimum 
has been studied.
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1.5 Studies of Bias in Signal Detection Experiments
Galanter and Holman (1967) trained humans to discrimin­
ate differences in noise intensity using a two alternative 
signal detection procedure. Subjects won cash for correctly 
detecting a difference or reporting, correctly, no difference. 
Subjects lost money for Incorrect choices. Thus, W2 2 , w21’ 
w12» and w ^  were varied so that there were 5 combinations of 
costs and payoffs with a resulting response bias for each set 
of outcomes. Because p ^ )  = p(S^) = .5, equation 1.4.8 be­
comes:
Bpbt = W22 " W21 (1.5.2)
W11 ' w12
The results could not be described by equation 1.5.2 suggesting 
that the subjects did not maximize the expected values of the 
outcomes (i.e., amount of money),Green (i960) has argued that 
internal level measurement of B-obtained may not be meaningful 
because rather large chansres in ^-obtained result in rather 
small changes in obtained payoff over a session suggesting 
that ouantitative predictions based on eouation 1.5.2 are not 
meaningful. Another interpretation is that subjects maximize 
subjective expected utility rather than expected value.
Equation 1.5.2 can thus be modified with a function trans­
forming the payoff ratio to equal ^ -obtained which defines 
the payoff ratio of equivalent utilities. If maximization of 
subjective expected utility is assumed;
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(1.5.3)
By replotting these data and the data from another similar 
experiment with humans (Green & Swets, 1966, pp. 83-93), the 
following formula was found to closely describe the relation 
between JB-obtained and the payoff ratio,
where 6 had a value less than 1.
Visual inspection of figure 1 indicates a rank order 
correlation of 1.0 between ^ -obtained and ^-optimum; moreover 
there is some convergence on an approximately linear function 
on log-log coordinates with a slope, 0, less than 1. The con­
sistency of this function across experiments suggests that 
differences between ^ -obtained which correspond to differences 
in JB-optimum represent a feature of the experiment, namely, the 
monetary value of the outcomes. Identification of ^ -obtained 
units with experimental condition (e.g., outcomes) is an 
essential criterion for an interval scale (Coombs, Dawes &
Tversky, 1970, ch. 2). Further support for the view that 
^-obtained is meaningful as an interval scale would be a 
demonstration of additivity of values of JB-obtained separately 
related to different outcome conditions.
Hobson (1970) varied relative probability and amount 
of reinforcement for correct detections and correct re-
(1.5.4)
FIGURE 1
The relation between ^ -obtained and ^ -optimum plotted 
on log-log coordinates. Values of ^ -obtained were determined 
by reanalysis of response probabilities reported graphically 
by Galanter & Holman (1967) and in a table by Tanner et al. 
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jections in an experiment where pigeons were trained to dis­
criminate response number. In her experiment, the animals 
initially pecked a center key a requisite number of times in
order to turn on a pair of side keys. Two response require­
ments were programmed to occur randomly; if the higher ratio
(number of responses per consequence) had been programmed a 
single peck to one of the side keys was reinforced, and
if the lower ratio had been programmed a single peck to the 
other side key was reinforced. The pair of side keys was
one of three colors which occurred irregularly on each trial.
The key colors signalled a different relative probability of
reinforcement for correct discriminations so that three 
different biasing conditions were in effect during a partic­
ular session. In subsequent conditions different relative 
amounts of reinforcement were programmed to occur in the
presence of the different key colors for one bird. Hobson 
found that in the presence of each key color the animal de­
veloped a response bias commensurate with the programmed con­
sequences; e.g., a stronger preference for the right key if
a greater probability or amount of reinforcement had been 
programmed for correct right key responses. Because the
probabilities of stimulus presentation were equal and the con­
sequences of errors, W2]_ and w-j^ , were null, equation 1.5.3
could be further simplified so that J30t)t, equalled a transformation 
of ^22^11' However, both probability of reinforcement and
amount of reinforcement were varied so that the outcomes were 
actually gambles with subjective expected utilities, E'ju(w)}.
Substituting for w22 and w -q  equation 1.5.3 becomes
VP(wll)wll/ E'[u(wllO
(1.5.5)
are subjective expected utilities
of correct rejections and correct detections and equal the product 
of the utility of a reinforcer times its subjective probability 
(outcome if reinforcement is not delivered is assumed null).
When amount of reinforcer was varied, the probability terms 
cancelled and the ratio of utilities, f(w22/w^), could be es­
timated by JB-obtained. Likewise, the ratio of subjective 
probability of reinforcement, f[p(w22)/p(w-j^)J could be estimated 
when the amounts of reinforcement were equal. For each condition 
three values of ^-obtained were obtained - one for each key 
color. In this way a total of six values of JB-obtained were 
estimated for six pairs of relative probability and amount of 
reinforcement. The functions relating the log ratio of re­
inforcement probability to log ^ B-obtained and the log ratio 
of amounts to JB-obtained are plotted in the top of Figure
2. The linear regression equations have nearly identical 
slopes; 0p = .82 for probability and 0^ = .84 for amount and 
identical intercepts, a, of .01. The data are too variable to 
determine If the functions are best described as linear; 
however, a linear function is assumed and used to transform 
amount into utility and probability into subjective prob­
ability:
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log J3' a = S^log ^22^Y\) + a 
l o g ^ ’p = 0plog p(w22)/p(w11) + a
(1.5.6)
where J3'A and )3'p are estimates of ^-optimum based on, res­
pectively, amount and probability of reinforcement. In the 
final condition of this series, Hobson varied both relative 
probability and amount of reinforcement. Using values of
and _J3'p estimated above ^ -obtained should be predicted by 
equation 1.5.5. If utility of an outcome and probability of 
an outcome combine multiplicatively (equ. 1.5.5) then their 
logarithms will combine additively,
The results are plotted in the bottom srraph in Figure 2
and sus’P’est that the predictions based on eouation 1.5.2 were 
accurate. Probability and amount can apparently be rescaled 
onto an expected utility dimension based on the values of 
^-obtained. Moreover, these two dimensions combine additively 
to accurately predict response bias implying that exnected 
utility may indeed be meaningful as an interval scale.
(1967); Green & Swets, (1966); and Hobson (1970) rather con­
vincingly sucrsrest that ,33-obtained is an interval scale. In 
addition further support is provided by Galanter & Holman 
(1967) and Green & Swets (1 9 6 6 ) who reported orderly and 
similar relations between losr ^ B-obtained and log ^ -optimum
l0? ^obt = 1oS>B'a + log^'p (1.5.7)
Thus, the results of experiments by Galanter & Holman
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FIGURE 2
The top panel presents the relation between lop 
^-obtained and lop J3-optimum. Circles are values of ^ -obtain­
ed produced by different amounts of reinforcement with ^-optimum 
the ratio of reinforcement amount for correct rejections over 
amount for correct detections. Trianples are values of 
^-obtained produced by different rrobabilities of reinforce­
ment with j3-optimurc the ratio of probability of reinforce­
ment for correct rejections over the probability of re­
inforcement for correct detections. The dashed line is 
fit to the circles by repression analysis. The solid line 
is fit to the trianples. The bottom panel values of ^ -obtained 
predicted from jB'-optimum based on the combined effects of 
utility and subjective probability (see text). The solid line 
Indicates matchinp between j3-obtained and -optimum. Data 









when stimulus probability was varied. With animals Hume & 
Irwin (1974) and Terman & Terman (1972) obtained orderly 
relations between ^-obtained and p(S2 )/p(S1); however, while 
the relation produced by Terman & Terman1s (1972) procedure 
could be closely described by a power function, the data 
Hume & Irwin (1974) report systematically depart from a 
power function. The relations between ^-obtained and 
^-optimum produced by individual animals in Hume & Irwin's 
experiment were S-shaped on log-log coordinates. In their 
experiment animals had rather brief, 500 trial, exposures 
to a particular p(S^) condition followed by a different 
bias condition. Terman & Terman's animals had about 2000 
trials of exposure to one p(S^) condition. It is likely that 
Hume & Irwin's animals did not have sufficient exposure to a 
particular bias condition for stable performance. In Terman 
& Terman's experiment the discriminabllity of S]_ and Sg was 
systematically decreased every 350 trials while a partic­
ular p(Si) was in effect so it is possible that their animals 
were not responding at an asymptotic level. It remains un­
clear what function best describes the relation between 
^-obtained and J3-optimum when probability of a stimulus is 
varied.
A particular function, which reliably describes the 
relationship between _J3-obtained and ^-optimum when probability 
is varied, could be considered a transformation function for 
converting objective probability into subjective probability. 
The primary purpose of this research was to define the trans-
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formation function for probability. This was done by re- 
analysing the results of other experiments in the Hume &
Irwin (1974) study in which p(S1) was varied according to 
different schedules (the bias functions were not reported) 
and an experiment was conducted in which the probability of
an outcome was varied.
In the present experiment animals were given approx­
imately 5000 trials of exposure to a particular outcome prob­
ability. Successive conditions with different outcome prob­
abilities were programmed with one stimulus condition in effect, 
permitting the definition of a relation between p-obtained 
and outcome probability under a particular stimulus condition.
Equation 1.4.8 implies that ^-obtained is related to 
the ratio of stimulus probabilities, p(S2 )/p(S-^), times a 
ratio of outcome values with no variable representing outcome 
probability. Using theorem 5.1 of expected utility theory 
(Luce & Raiffa, 1959) one can substitute the expected value 
of an outcome for an outcome so equation 1.4.8 becomes,
B _ p(S2 ) E(wgg) + E(w 2i ) (1.5.9)
Ftsjy E(wn ) + E(w12T
which says that the two alternatives available to an animal 
under a particular stimulus condition represent two gambles 
rather than two certain outcomes. The expected values of 
correct detections and correct rejections were the probability 
of the outcome times the value of the outcome, p(w)w, where 
the outcome was always a .02 cc dipper of water and w was
29
assumed null if reinforcement did not occur. Because w a**d 
w^2 » the consequence of incorrect responses, were assumed 
null, the expected values of those alternatives were elimin­
ated from equation 1.5.9. The ratio of stimulus probabilities 
was eliminated because in this experiment the programmed prob­
ability of either stimulus which the animals discriminated was 
.5 and, thus, p(S2)/p(S1) = 1. That left
because w22 and wn  were identical .02 cc dippers of water. 
The right side of equation 1.5.10 is p-optimum. Equation 
1.5.10 would hold only if an animal's subjective probability 
estimates matched objective outcome probability. Departures 
from a matching relation would be characterized as a re-
where f was the transformation function which converted the 
ratio of objective probabilities into the corresponding ratio 
of subjective probabilities. The transformation function 
was defined by JB-obtained which represents the effect a par­
ticular set of outcome probabilities had on response bias; 
that is, subjective probability is being directly indicated by




lation between p-obtained and p-optimum,
a continuous measure of behavior ^-obtained. If the relations 
between ^ -obtained and J3-optimum measured for individual 
animals converged onto a particular function then ^-obtained 
could be considered an interval level measure of outcome 
probabilities. If, in addition, this same function charac­
terized the effects of varying stimulus probability in other 
experiments (Hume & Irwin, 1974; Terman & Terman, 1972) then 
a general transformation function for converting objective 
probability into subjective probability would be Indicated.
In this experiment the scale of subjective probability 
was derived by varying relative probability of an outcome. 
Probability of a stimulus occurrence and probability of an 
outcome may be qualitatively different continua. Such a 
difference would be indicated if bias functions obtained in 
experiments where p(S^) was varied did not have the same 
form as bias functions obtained in this experiment. Another 
indication of a aualitative difference would be a failure 
to predict the effects of p(S2 )/p(S-l) on behavior using a 
scale of subjective probability derived by varying prob­
ability of an outcome. In one condition of this experiment 
a particular value of p(S^) was chosen and the bias effect 
predicted using the subjective probability scales derived by 
varying outcome possibilities. If varying the probability 
of either a stimulus or an outcome resulted in the same 
function relating JB-obtalned and ^-optimum, then one should 
predict ^-obtained when both are varied. The combinatorial 
rule when more than one variable affecting response bias 
changes is
31
B . . = P'(s?> . E' [u(w22>| " E' [u<"21>]
robt ---------   =----- ------ ~
P ' (Sx ) E' ju(wl;L)] - E' [u(w12)j
(1.5.11)
where p'(S) is the subjective probability of an outcome and 
Eju(wJ] is the expected utility of the various outcomes in­
dicated by the subscripts. That is, separate definition of 
the expected utilities of various outcomes and the subjective 
probability of a stimulus presentation should enable ^-obtained 
to be predicted. Equation 1.5.11 is an analogue to eouation 
1.4.8 in terms of subjective expected utility. Assuming 
e[u(wi2| and E [u (w2 )^j - eouation 1.5.11 becomes, in
logarithmic terms,
and if w22 and w -q  are equal as they were in this experiment 
then equation 1.5.12 suggests that the bias effects of vary- 
both p(S2 )/p(S1 ) and p(w22)/p(w^) will be additive,
and p(w22) were reduced to .4 and the corresponding subjective 
probabilities, p'(S2 ) and p'(w22), and their complements were 
computed usinsr the subjective probability scales derived 
when outcome probability was varied. If ^-obtained is indeed 
and interval scale then the effects of varyinsr these two 
biasing variables should be additive.
log = P ^S2 ^ + log pl (w2g^
p 'Cs-l) p M w j j)
(1.5.13)
In the final condition of this experiment both p(S2 )
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Defining an interval level subjective probability scale 
which corresponds to the continuum of objective probability 
should enable one to auantitatively predict an individual's 
choice behavior in other situations. In the present study, 
these other situations were different stimulus conditions 
where a subject discriminated with a different level of 
accuracy than when the subjective probability function was de­
fined. The relations between ^-obtained and J3-optimum should 
remain invariant when stimulus conditions are changed if the 






Seven albino rats, R10-R16, were used at various 
stasres in this experiment. Only R12, Rl4, and Rl6 were run 
under all conditions, R13 and R15 died, and RIO and Rll were 
started after the experiment was underway. The animals 
were housed in a continuously lighted room. They had ad lib 
access to food and were maintained on a 15 - 20 cc daily water 
ration in addition to the water obtained during the session.
2.2 Apparatus
In a conventional rat chamber, 23.5 by 20.5 by 19.5 cm, 
two levers were mounted symmetrically on the front wall, 10 
cm apart, with a .02 cc water dinner centered between them. A 
single lever was mounted centrally at the rear of the chamber.
A dim houselight provided general illumination throughout the 
session except when it was briefly turned off following in­
correct resnonses (discussed below). Visual signals were pro­
duced by lighting a symmetrical array of bulbs in a matrix of 
25 bulbs, mounted centrally above the chamber. The light was 
diffused through two layers of milk plastic, uniformly illu­
minating the chamber. Illumination was varied by lighting a 
different number of bulbs and was measured as illumination of 
the ceiling which was transluminated by the light source. The 
chamber and its associated equipment were enclosed in a sound- 
attenuating box which was located in the animal colony where
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humidity and temperature were regulated. The electromechanical 
programming and recording equipment was located in a separate 
room.
2.3 Procedure
The rats R12-R16 were trained with water reinforcement 
to press the right bar in the presence of a 1.20 ft.-Ca illum­
ination and to press the left bar while the light intensity 
was .37 ft.-Ca. They were trained to press the centrally lo­
cated rear lever after all animals were reliably pressing the 
risrht lever when the brighter light was on and the left lever 
in the presence of the dimmer light. The animals were then 
put on a close approximation to the final procedure.
A single rear-lever press produced either S^, the brighter 
light, (1.2 ft.-Ca) or S2, the dimmer light (.37 ft.-Ca). If Sx 
occurred then a single press on the right front lever (R-^ ), a 
correct detection, was reinforced with water; if Sg came on 
the a single press on the left front lever (Rglt a correct re­
jection, produced water. Incorrect responses, a left lever 
press (R^) when was on, a miss, or a right lever press 
(R^) when occurred, a false alarm, never produced water.
After the animals had learned this sequence, the probability 
of reinforcement was reduced to .5 for correct responses and 
after incorrect responses a 3 second time-out occurred.
Durinv the time-out the houselisrht was off and responses had 
no consequences. The time-out was added to disrupt stereo­
typic response patterns where an animal would rapidly alternate 
between the rear lever and a preferred front lever - collect-
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lng reinforcement whenever a response happened to be correct. 
There was no intertrial interval, thus following correct 
responses the animal could immediately press the rear bar to 
initiate the next trial.
The Intensity of S2 was gradually increased to 1.05 ft.- 
Ca, and after nerformance stabilized by visual inspection, a 
series of biasing conditions was imposed. Approximately 70 
training sessions were completed before the first con­
dition. Sessions were, at first, 500 trials, however, follow­
ing the first two bias conditions the session length was 
shortened to 300 trials because some animals stopped responding 
after 300 - 400 trials. Durinsr each biasing condition there 
was a different probability of reinforcement for correct de­
tections and correct rejections. The reinforcement probabilities 
were always complementary so that overall the probability of 
reinforcement for correct responses remained .5. In the first 
bias condition the probability of reinforcement for correct 
detections was .9 and correct rejections produced reinforcement 
with a probability of .1. In subsequent bias conditions the 
probability of reinforcement for correct detections, p(w^^), 
was .1, .4, .6, and .5. The probability of reinforcement for 
correct rejections, p(wpp) was 1 - p(w-q). The stimuli were 
made more discriminable by changing Sp to .66. A series of 
8 bias conditions was programmed with p(w^^) equal to .5, .9,
.1, .6, .4, .3, .7, .5 and pNpp) equal to the respective com­
plements. Following this series of conditions the probability 
of was decreased to .4 and in the final condition p (w q ) 
was decreased from .5 to .4 in order to assess the combined
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effects of these two biasing variables. The sequence of con­
ditions is listed in Table 1 along with the animals who com­
pleted the particular conditions. RIO and Rll were trained 
using a procedure similar to the other animals and intro­
duced into the exneriment followin'? the change in stimulus 
conditions after receiving approximately 40 training sessions. 
The number of sessions and trials per condition are also listed 
in Table 1. For the first 2 bias conditions longer and fewer 
sessions were run with all subsequent conditions 15 sessions 
of 301 trials each. The number of trials per condition exceeded 
the number used in other experiments where response bias was 
varied (Hume, 1974; Hume & Irwin, 1974; Terman & Terman, 1972) 
and was sufficient to produce performance which did not system­
atically Increase or decrease (i.e., was stable) by the last 
1000 trials for nearly all conditions in a previous experiment 
(Whittaker, in prep).
TABLE 1
The sequence of conditions is listed in the order 
of their presentation. Columns are, respectively, condition 
number, the illumination of the stimuli (S-j_ and S2 ) discriminated 
by the animals, programmed probability of reinforcement for 
correct detections (reinforcement probability for correct re­
jections is the complement), programmed probability of 
presentation (probability of S2 presentation is the complement), 
number of trials per daily session, and number of sessions per 
condition. In the last 7 columns the animals tested under 










1.20 1.05 501 10 12
1.20 121.05 501
1.20 3011.05
1.20 ! 301 121.05
301 11. 66 10 121.20
12301 10 111.20 . 66





10 301 11101.20 • 66
' 301 11 12101.20 .66
11 12301 101.20 .66
301 12101.20 • 66
301 12101.20 . 66
301 12101. 20 .66
^Summary data not reported, sessions less than half completed.
SECTION III 
RESULTS
3.1 The Effects of Relative Reinforcement Probability 
on Response Probability 
Changing the relative probability of reinforcement for 
correct detections usually brought about an abrupt shift in 
the probabilities of correct detections and false alarms. 
Increases in reinforcement probability for correct detections 
resulted in higher probabilities of renorting the bright light, 
R^, in the presence of both stimulus conditions; when the 
probability of reinforcement for correct detections was re­
duced the probability of correct detections and false alarms 
decreased. When difference in luminance between and S2 
increased, the probability of correct detections and false 
alarms diverged. Changes in both discrimination accuracy and 
response bias can be seen in some session-by-session plots of 
resnonse probabilities of randomly chosen animals in Figure
3. The top two panels present performance under less dis­
criminate conditions. The middle and bottom panels are from 
conditions where the luminance difference between and Sg 
was greater. The changes in behavior accompanying stimulus 
change can be clearly seen with a larger separation of the 
probabilities of correct detections and false alarms in the lower 
four panels. Modifying the relative probability of reinforce­
ment drove both the probabilities of correct detections and 
false alarms to a different level - usually within 5 sessions.
FIGURE 3
The probabilities of correct detections (p(C.D.)) 
and false alarms (p(F.A.)) are plotted for successive dally 
sessions. Different panels Include data for different 
animals. Different bias conditions are delineated with 
vertical dashed lines with the probability of reinforce­
ment for correct detections which was in effect centered 
above the sessions. The top two panels include data from 
the less discrlminable stimulus conditions. The bottom 
four panels Include data from more discrimlnable stimulus 
conditions.
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A subsequent systematic drift in response probabilities in 
some animals appears more as changes in accuracy than bias.
For Rll (.9), R12 (.6), and Rl4 (.7) false alarm probabilities 
diminished with no discernible change in the probability of 
correct detections. Following a shift in reinforcement 
probability to .3, the probability of correct detection by 
R16 increased through that condition with no systematic 
change in false alarm probability. R12, however, shows a 
decrement in the probability of R^ in both stimulus conditions 
during the latter half of the .4 condition - a shift in bias. 
These animals typify the performance of other animals in the 
accommodation of their performance to new stimulus and re­
inforcement conditions. Usually session to session variation 
in performance by the last 3 sessions of a condition was either 
not systematic or suggestive of a gradual drift in response 
probability.
The pooled data from the last 3 sessions were used to 
characterize the effects of the relative probability of re­
inforcement for that condition. In all but the first 3 con­
ditions of the experiment these response probabilities are 
based on a total of 900 trials, approximately 450 presenta­
tions and 450 Sg presentations over 3 sessions. In the first 
3 conditions there were 500 rather than 300 trials per session. 
To insure that measured performance in the 500 trial sessions 
was comparable to 300 trial sessions, the last 200 trials were 
excluded. For condition 3 a total of 900 trials was pooled, 
but for conditions 1 and 2 only 600 trials were used to com­
pute the summary statistics because the first 100 trials of
these conditions were not counted. Decisions concerning the 
data to be used were made prior to data analysis.
By examining summary response probabilities listed 
in Table 2 one can see lower accuracy in conditions 1 through 
5, when the luminance difference was smaller, than in the re­
maining conditions. Lower accuracy is indicated by less 
difference between the probability of correct detections and 
false alarms. The response probabilities also reveal a shift 
in preference with both the probability of correct detections 
and false alarms positively correlated with the relative 
probability of reinforcement for correct detections.
Separation of changes in accuracy and bias by direct 
examination of response probabilities is at best difficult 
and can only be qualitative because an Increase in preference 
for one alternative will necessarily decrease the difference 
between the probability of correct detections and false alarms 
as they both converge on 1 or 0. Signal detection analysis is 
preferred because it permits the separation of changes in bias 
and discrimination accuracy into logically independent Indices 
computed from the probability of correct detections and false 
alarms.
TABLE 2
Condition number, programmed probability of re­
inforcement for correct detections and summary statistics; 
probability of correct detections, probability of false 
alarms, probability of R^, d1, and p-obtained listed for 
individual animals; conditions 1-13. If both probabilities 
of correct detections and false alarmss were greater than 
.99 or less than .01, d' and were not computed because
these statistics could not be accurately estimated by response 



























Condition p(tft^ C.D.) p(c.D.) pCK.A.) p(Rj) d' ^obt
i ■ .9 .993 .973 .98 .542 .303
2 .1 .053 .013 .03 .604 3.18
3 ' .4 .147 .053 .10 .562 2.11
4 .6 .501 .432 .46 .224 1.02
5 .5 .147 .102 .12 .222 1.29
6 .5 .913 .079 .30 2.77 1.07
7 .1 .836 .009 .42 3.35 10.3
S .9 .985 .529 .76 2.08 .098
9 .6 .956 .079 .52 3.12 .628
10 .4 .833 .043 .43 2.68 2.75
11 .3 .931 .016 .48 3.61 3.*27-
12 .7 .980 .079 .52 3.47 .325
13 .5 .970 .055 .52 3.48 .610
AnirjJ #' 15
Condition pCrftl C.D.) p(C.D.) P(F.A.) P(RX) d* Pobt
1 .9 .957 .883 .92 .524 .468
o .1 .033 .007 .02 .642 3.99
3 .4 .380 .220 .30 .470 1.23
I
Anltaal £ 16
dltlon p(rfC) C.D.) P(C.D.) P(?.A.) p{Rl> •d'
1 .9 .967 .373 .92 .690 .358
2 .1 .070 .003 .04 1.27 12.9
3 .4 .181 .064 .12 .610 1.67















7 .1 .504 .027 .26 1.93 6.33
8 .9 .983 .975 .SS .164 .716
9 .6 .713 .200 .46 1.42 1.21
10 .4 .389 .062 .22 1.25 3.13
11 . .3 .765 .030 .40 2.60 4.47
12 .7 .971 .531 .74 1.58 .255
13 .5 .749 .122 .44 1.83 1.53
3.2 Signal Detection Analysis 
The performance of any detection device, human, animal 
or electronic operating on the basis of the theory of signal 
detectability outlined in the introduction, can be completely 
described by what is called the "receiver operating character­
istic curve" or R.O.C. curve. The R.O.C. curve is a functional 
relationship between the probabilities of correct detections 
and false alarms. Because misses and correct rejections are 
respective complements of correct detections and false alarms, 
all the information about the receiver1s performance is con­
tained in the correct detection and false alarm rate. For 
any fixed set of experimental conditions the theory says there 
will be a a criterion beyond which the observer will re­
port Si (the brighter light). The observer's correct detection 
and false alarm probability will be the areas under the S]_ and 
S2 distributions respectively, above the point defined by ji.
The assumption that the distributions are normal permits one to 
convert response probabilities into z scores using a table for 
the unit normal distribution. The z score equivalents to the 
probability of a correct detection are plotted as a function 
of the z-transformation of the probability of false alarms.
An R.O.C. curve plotted on z-transformed coordinates more 
clearly illustrates changes in accuracy and shifts in bias 
than R.O.C. plots on linear-linear coordinates. The R.O.C. 
curves which characterize the performance of the observers 
in this experiment, in Figure 4, are on probability-probability 
coordinates which directly transform response probability into
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a z equivalent. (Green & Swets, 1966, discuss this issue 
in depth).
The major diagonal which extends from the lower left 
to the upper right corners of the R.O.C. plots in Figure 4 
is the expected R.O.C. curve if the receiver responds randomly 
with respect to the stimuli. Along this line the probability 
of correct detections equals the probability of false alarms 
suggesting that the distributions and Sp are identical. A 
point on this curve merely reflects the observer's bias for R-^ . 
If R^ occurred randomly of the time, then both pCR^jS-^) and 
p (Ri| ) would equal .4. Alonpr the major diagonal the likeli­
hood ratio, ^-obtained, would always be 1 because the ordinate 
heights of the hypothetical and Sp distributions are 
identical. Curves plotted above this diagonal also describe 
both accuracy and response bias. In Figure 4, the distance 
of the curves from the major diagonal is constant at all points 
because they have identical unit slopes. This distance repre­
sents accuracy and the value of the parameter d 1. When d' is 
computed from the probability of correct detections and false 
alarms directly, it is the distance of the point representing 
these probabilities from the major diagonal. Points along 
each curve correspond to different response biases and in all 
cases, except the major diagonal, different likelihood ratios. 
The likelihood ratios can also be computed directly from the 
probabilities of correct detections and false alarms for 
each point. The likelihood ratio, called ^-obtained, is 
the criterion chosen by the observer for a given payoff and 
stimulus condition.
FIGURE 4
R.O.C. plots of the probability of correct detections 
as a function of probability of false alarms for each animal. 
Points represent different bias conditions with the prob­
ability of reinforcement for correct detections indicated 
adjacent to each point. Open squares are data from more dis­
criminate stimulus conditions with illuminance (ft.Ca.) 
values of and Sg indicated in the legend. Closed squares 
are data from less discriminate stimulus conditions. The 
major diagonal extends from the lower left to the upper right 
corners of each plot. The other solid lines represent 
theoretical R.O.C. curves for median values of d* across 
all bias conditions within a stimulus condition.
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In this experiment d' was computed by first converting 
the probability of correct detections and false alarms into 
corresponding z scores for a unit normal distribution, and 
then computing the difference between the two z scores. The 
values of d' for each relative reinforcement condition did 
not change systematically for individual animals under the 
less discriminable stimulus condition. This can be seen by 
examining values of d' in Table 2 or graphically as the dis­
tance of the closed points from the major diagonal. The R.O.C. 
curve was estimated from the median d1 across reinforcement 
conditions and is based on the assumption that the underlying 
distributions of and S2 are normal and of equal variance.
If the actual distributions were not normal, the R.O.C. curve 
would not be linear. If the distributions did not have equal 
variance, then the R.O.C. curve would not have a unit slope 
(Green & Swets, 1966). Under the less discriminable conditions 
the points do not depart systematically from predicted R.O.C. 
curves. Under the conditions where the animals were discrim­
inating a greater difference in and S? the obtained prob­
abilities of correct detections and false alarms depart sys­
tematically from the predicted R.O.C. curve. The curve was 
drawn assuming Gaussian distributions of equal variance and 
a median d' across relative reinforcement conditions 6 to 13. 
The data under this stimulus condition are too variable to 
evaluate the linearity prediction; however, a denarture from 
a unit slope is evident. Points resulting from the .7 and .9 
relative reinforcement conditions tend to be closer to the 
major diagonal (lower d' in Table 2) than their complement
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conditions, .3 and .1. This suggests that the distribution 
assumption of equal variance is incorrect. In addition, the 
assumption that the underlying distributions of S-^  and Sg are 
normal is not clearly supported. Both assumptions are im­
portant for the computation of the bias index j3-obtalned; 
fortunately, additional data from a nearly identical experiment 
are available.
In Figure 5, data are reolotted from an experiment by 
Nevin, Olsen, Mandell, and Yarensky, (1975) which used rats 
trained to discriminate light intensity differences. The 
study was conducted in the same chamber used in this experiment 
with differences in lisrht intensity controlled with an identical 
apparatus. Two rats were discriminating with accuracy similar 
to performance of rats in the more discriminable stimulus con­
dition; however, their data are much more orderly. The data 
converge on a linear function when they are plotted on prob- 
ability-probability coordinates supporting the assumptions that 
the underlying distributions of and S2 are normal.
Although available evidence supports linearity of the 
R.O.C. curve, the discrepancy between the slopes obtained 
under more discriminable conditions (Figure 4) and the slopes 
obtained in the Nevin, et al. (1975) study leaves the assumption 
of equal variances auestlonable. This raises problems in com­
puting an estimate of ^ -obtained.
The formula for ^ -obtained, £obt> *s
/Bobt = £sil^2 (3.2.1)
*S2(X )
FIGURE 5
R.O.C. plots of the probability of correct detection 
as a function of probability of a false alarm for two animals 
discriminating the same stimuli. The major diagonal extends 
from the lower left to the upper right corners. The other 
diagonals are theoretical R.O.C. curves.
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p-obtained Is estimated by locating the z score corresponding 
to the probability of correct detections in a table for the 
unit normal distribution; the formula for the unit normal 
distribution (Hays & Winkler, 1971', p. 215) is used to compute 
the ordinate height, fsi^z *^ Likewise, fg2(z) is computed 
from the probability of false alarms
JVbt = -sl^ -) (3.2.2) 
fBa(z)
If the variances of the and S2 distributions are equal, then 
the z scores represent equivalent units on x and equation 3.2.2 
produces the same estimate of p-obtained as equation 3.2.1. If 
the variances differ, however, then equations 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 
are not equivalent (McNicol, 1972).
When S-^  and S2 distributions do not have equal variance 
then two nonequivalent estimates of the likelihood ratio are 
available, equation 3.2.1 or 3.2.2. If equation 3.2.1 is used 
then the relation between p-obtained and p-optimum (equation 
1.4.6) is
fSl(x) = P S^2^ . w22 + W12 (3.2.4)
f*S2(x ) b(S1 ) w1]L + w21
If equation 3.2.2 is used, then equation 3.2.4 would be re­
written as
f51(z) = p(S2 )  ^ w22 + wl2 
^S2(z) p(S]_) w^^ + W21
(3.2.5)
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An estimate of ^-obtained based on values of x(eqn. 
3.2.2) requires an additional parameter, m, which describes 
the relative variance of the two distributions. Normal dis­
tributions of z scores always have a variance of 1, so an 
additional parameter is not necessary and different variances 
of the S-^  and Sg distributions can be ignored. As there are 
no available data to guide the selection of one of the two 
procedures for estimating the likelihood ratio, equation
3.2.2 was chosen because it is the more parsimonious of the 
two.
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3.5 The Effects of Relative Reinforcement Probability
on B-o~btained 
Expected utility theory predicts a unique relation 
between ^-obtained and relative reinforcement probability. 
This relation, developed in the introduction as equation 
1.5.5, is:
ities of, respectively, correct rejections and correct detections. 
The rule for transforming the ratio of the expected values of a 
correct rejection, p(wp2)w22’ over ^he expected value of correct 
detections, p(w11)w^1, is f. All rats received an identical 
.02 cc dipper of water for correct rejections, and correct 
detections. Accordingly the payoffs for correct rejections,
Wg2 » an(3 correct detections, w-q, can be considered equal so 
the ratio of expected values of correct discriminations be­
come equivalent to the ratio of the probabilities of re­
inforcement, p(w2 2  ^ an(^  P(wll) which were programmed. The 
probability of reinforcement for correct rejections over 
the complementary probability of reinforcement for correct de­
tections is called ^-optimum because matching ^-obtained and the 
ratio of reinforcement probabilities would produce the maximum 
number of reinforcements in a session. If matching occurred, 
then f would be linear with a unit slope and expected utility
(5.3.1)
where e£u(w2 2 )J are the subjective expected util-
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would equal expected value. The relations between log J3-ob- 
tained and log J3-optimum are plotted for individual animals in 
Figure 6. Values of ^-obtained derived from performance under 
different stimulus conditions are distinguished on the graphs 
of animals who were tested under both conditions. In cases 
where there were more than 3 points for a particular stimulus 
condition, a regression analysis was performed to determine 
the best fit linear function relating log J3-obtained to log 
^-optimum under a particular stimulus condition. Regression 
lines for different stimulus conditions are also distinguished 
in Figure 6 and the parameters are listed in Table 3.
The data in Figure 6 are well described by linear 
functions. The correlation coefficients, with the excention of 
R16, are all above .94 (see Table 3) and departures from the 
regression lines are not systematic. A linear function on 
log-log coordinates implies that ^-obtained is a power function 
of _J3-optimum.
The slopes of the regression lines differ from 1 for 
data obtained under both stimulus conditions for all animals, 
suggesting that animals did not maximize objective value. The 
objective probabilities of reinforcement could be rescaled as 
subjective probability according to a power function to 
produce matching between ,B-obtained and ^-optimum. The animals 
could then be considered to have maximized expected utility. 
Such a transformation could take the form
p' (w) = [p(w)] 6 (3.3.2)
FIGURE 6
Log ^ -obtained as function of log ^-optimum. Solid 
lines are fit to triangles by regression analysis; dashed 
lines are fit to circles. Triangles represent data generated 
under more discriminable stimulus conditions (illuminance 
values of and S2 are specified in the legend); circles 
represent data obtained under less discriminable stimulus 
conditions. Two points are not plotted; for RIO the value 
of JB-obtained was 0 when _J3-optimum = -.96 and for R12 the 
value of ^ -obtained under less discriminable stimulus con­





















where p 1(w) is subjective probability and 0 the slope of the 
regression line listed in Table 3. This follows because if




^obt “ a ^ opt
^cpt =/hCw2a)]
W wn V
£obt = a/PU22l)6 (3.3.3)
\p (w u )/
This argument states that the exponent of the power 
function relating p-obtained to p-optimum also is the exponent 
of a power function which converts objective probability into 
subjective probability. The y-intercept in Table 3, a, in­
dicates a general preference for R-^  or Rg and could be con­
sidered the animal’s subjective indifference point. It repre­
sents the predicted value of p-obtained if ^ -optimum equals 1 
(log p-optimum equals 0); that is, when the programmed outcomes 
of correct detections and correct rejections are equal.
Rescaling objective probability of reinforcement into 
subjective probability should permit p-obtained to be predicted 
under different stimulus conditions. The relations between p- 
obtalned and p-optimum should not systematically change when 
stimulus conditions change. In Figure 6, the regression lines
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TABLE 3















10 1.8 -.125 1. 57* .127 .984 .134
11 2.2 .226 .896 .087 .977 .204
12 .62 _ — _ -
2.0 .330 1.14 .178 .944 .261
13 .76 .038 .571 .060 .984 .082
1.3 -.050 .793 .132 .973 .181
14 .54 . 086 .547 .084 .967 .115
3.2 -.010 1.12 .093 .977 .146
15 .50 . 066 .493 .075 .978 .103
16 .49 .196 .861 . 140 .962 .192
1.5 .170 . 665 . 208 .794 .305
^Minimum slope since one point could not be defined on log 
coordinate (JB=0)
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through values of p-obtained resulting under more discrim­
inable stimulus conditions generally have steeper slopes than 
the regression lines obtained under less discriminable con­
ditions. (See also regression coefficients in Table 3). How­
ever, Rl6 and R12 are exceptions. A regression line is plotted 
for R16 which has a steeper slope under the less discriminable 
conditions. The regression line for the less discriminable 
conditions is not plotted for R12 because the animal exclusively 
preferred R2 when pCw^) = .1 (log p-optimum = .954). Such an 
extreme preference results in p-obtained equal to infinity. 
Although the point could not be defined it is certainly sug­
gestive of a steeper slope under less discriminable conditions. 
Although there are two animals who have p~p functions which 
are steeper under less discriminable conditions, R13, R14, and R15 
generated data which converged on linear functions with shallower 
slopes under less discriminable conditions. Their data were less 
variable (i.e., lower standard error of slope in Table 3) than 
data generated by Rl6 and thus are more reliable estimates of 
the slopes of regression lines. Shallower slopes under less 
discriminable conditions are thus indicated although not re­
liably.
Examination of the relations between log ^ -obtained and 
log ^ B-optimum plotted in Figure 6 leads to two conclusions. 
Firstly, a power function converts objective probability of 
reinforcement into subjective probability. Secondly, es­
timates of subjective probability, obtained under one stimulus 
condition, do not reliably predict ^ -obtained under a very 
different stimulus condition.
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3.4 Predicting J3-obtained from Estimates of pMS^) and
P 1(w11)
If subjective probability of payoff and stimulus pre­
sentation are equivalent transformations of objective probabil­
ity then the scale of subjective probability developed by vary­
ing relative reinforcement could be used to predict the effects 
of varying p(S^) on _J3-obtained. In condition 14 the probability 
of reinforcement for correct detections and correct rejections 
was equal and the stimulus conditions were not changed. The 
probability of occurrence of the bright light (S-^ ) was re­
duced to .4. Equation 1.4.8 predicts that this should result 
in a bias toward reporting the dim light. This prediction 
can be expressed (see also equation 1.5.1) quantitatively as,
or if objective and subjective probabilities are not equal 




The purpose of condition 14 was to determine whether 
subjective probability, p'(S2 ) and p'(S-|_) or objective prob­
ability would more accurately predict ^-obtained. Subjective
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probability was estimated by a power transformation of the 
objective probability with the exponent, 6, estimated in the 
previous conditions 6-13 where probability of reinforcement 
was varied under the more discrimlnable stimulus conditions.
The animal's general response bias for over R2, expressed 
as a, is also estimated from the previous conditions (see Section 
2.4) for each animal. The results of this condition are listed 
in Table 4. ^-obtained did not vary systematically from J3- 
optimum which was based on subjective probability (Equation 
2.5.1); however, when J3-optimum was based on the ratio of 
objective stimulus probabilities then J3-obtalned was under­
estimated for all animals. The difference between obtained 
and predicted was averaged across animals. When objective 
probabilities were used the mean difference was .194 and the 
standard error was .29; however, when scaled probabilities 
were used the mean difference reduced to .072 with a lower 
standard error of .166. In this case an estimate of subjective 
probability based on objective probability of reinforcement 
predicts the effects of probability of a stimulus occurrence 
on response bias with more accuracy and reliability than if 
objective probabilities were used.
The purpose of condition 15 was to determine if 
p'(S2 )/p'(S^) and p' (w22)/p1 (wp^) have additive effects on 
JB-obtained. Additivity is predicted by Equation 3.4.3 and 
the assumption that subjective probability is an interval scale.
In condition 15 the probability of the bright light 
remained at .4 and the probability of reinforcement for 
correct detections decreased to .4. As a consequence, all
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TABLE 4
Summary statistics for individual animals; conditions 
14 and 15. Columns are, respectively, animal number, programmed 
probability of reinforcement for correct detections (rein­
forcement probability for correct rejections is the com­
plement), programmed probability of presentation (prob­
ability of S2 presentation is the complement), probability of 
correct detections, probability of false alarms, predicted 
J50bt on the basis of objective probabilities or reinforcement 
and stimulus presentation, predicted J30-bt on the basis of 
(scaled) subjective probabilities of reinforcement and 
stimulus presentation, ^-obtained, and the differences be­
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animals developed a stronger preference for R£ indicated by 
a higher log ^-obtained which could be predicted as (see 
Equation 1.4.6):
J30bt = . g.i>221 (3.4.3)
p(Sx) E(wlx)
where E(w) = o(w)w (outcome if reinforcement is not delivered 
is assumed null). Because w^2 = Equation 3.4.3 becomes:
log J3 . . = log P(S2 ) + log P 1W22I (3.4.4) 
P(ST ) p(wn )
The prediction of jB-obtained based on scaled probabilities is 
computed as follows:
log ,J3obt = a + ©log P(s2) + ©log p (w ?2) (3.4.5)
p(Sp) p (w h )
The slope, ©, and the y-intercept, a, are parameters estimated 
for each animal in Table 3. In Table 4 the ^-obtained exceed 
the predicted based on either objective or subjective prob­
abilities; however, the differences between predictions based 
on Equation 3.4.5 are smaller for 3 of the 4 animals when 
subjective probabilities were used. For RIO, R14, and R16 
the estimates based on Equation 3.4.5 are within the standard 
error of estimates for these animals listed in the last 
column of Table 3. These standard error of estimates are 
based on the regression analysis of the relation between
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^-obtained and ^-optimum when probability of reinforcement 
was varied (conditions 6-13) and indicate exoected variability 
of data around estimates based on transformation of objective 
probabilities into subjective probability.
It appears that predictions of the bias effects when 
the probability of a stimulus is .4 are more accurate and re­
liable when a subjective scale of probability is used than if 
an objective scale is used, even though the scale was derived 
by varying probability of reinforcement. The bias effects 
when both p(S-^ ) and p(w22 ) were set to .4 did not deviate 
significantly from predictions based on the additivity hypothesis 




4.1 The Interaction of ^-obtained and Stimulus Conditions 
All animals exhibited a stronger preference for an 
alternative if it was associated with a higher probability of 
reinforcement. Inspection of the probabilities of correct 
detections and false alarms or the unconditional probability 
of reporting the bright light (R^) in Table 2 reveals this 
ordering of preferences as a positive correlation between the 
probability of and the relative probability of reinforcement 
for correct detections, p(R^/S^). A higher probability of re­
inforcement for correct detections relative to correct rejections 
generally resulted in a higher probability of correct detections 
and false alarms under either discrimination condition. Al­
though examination of response probabilities would reveal a rank 
ordering of preference, the quantitative effects of relative 
probability of reinforcement on preference (or bias) measured 
directly using response probabilities are obscured in a de­
tection situation by changes in discrimination accuracy. A 
signal detection analysis was performed to disentangle changes 
in bias from changes in discrimination accuracy. Quantitative 
effects of changing the relative probability of reinforcement 
on behavior were examined using an index of response bias 
which was purportedly independent of changes in discrimination 
accuracy (Dusoir, 1975; Green & Swets, 1966).
The relation between J3-obtained and ^-optimum,
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p(w2 2 )/p(wn )  > apparently was not Independent of stimulus con­
ditions. The slopes of the bias function tended to be more 
shallow under less discriminable stimulus conditions. By 
themselves, the differences in slopes obtained in this ex­
periment were not large enough or consistent enough to con­
clusively suggest non-independence of ^-obtained and discrimination 
performance; however, these data fit into a pattern of results 
from three other experiments in which a bias condition was 
systematically varied under different stimulus conditions.
In an auditory detection experiment, Terman & Terman 
(1972) trained rats to discriminate two tone intensities.
The animals were reinforced with electrical brain stimulation 
for pressing a lever if the higher intensity tone, S p  was 
presented, and for not pressing the lever if the lower in­
tensity stimulus, S2 , was presented. Probability of the 
louder tone was varied from session to session in an irregular 
order. During each daily session the difference in stimulus 
intensity was decreased in a descending series of 8 intensity 
differences. A particular stimulus condition was in effect 
for 350 trials. Probability of the louder stimulus, p(S^) 
was varied from session to session in irregular order, using 
the following values; 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and for one 
animal, 0.4. The series of probability values was repeated 
4 times. Because R.O.C. curves of Terman & Terman1s data on 
probability-probability coordinates are well approximated by 
linear functions, using data provided by Terman, ^-obtained 
was calculated from z-scores (see equation 3.2.2) and used as
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an index of response bias. The relation between log ^-obtained 
and p(S2 )/p(S1), called ^-optimum, is plotted in Figure 7 for 
the two animals used in Terman & Terman's experiment. A 
different bias function was plotted for each of three different 
stimulus conditions. As the two tones became less discriminable, 
the slopes of the JB-J3 functions systematically decreased for 
each animal. The apparent interaction between bias functions 
and stimulus conditions could have represented an order effect. 
Stimuli became less discriminable in successive conditions with­
in the same session. Perhaps animals tend to decrease response 
bias toward the end of a session regardless of stimulus con­
ditions.
In an experiment by Hume & Irwin (1974) order and 
discriminability factors were not confounded. Hume & Irwin 
used a two alternative signal detection procedure similar to 
the one used in this experiment to train rats to discriminate 
different noise intensities. (Their procedure is discussed 
in the introduction). An irregular order of stimulus prob­
abilities was presented, with a series of 6 discrimination 
conditions presented in a descending, then ascending seauence 
of intensity differences. Only 2 stimulus conditions were 
presented per day in blocks of 500 trials.
Resultant R.O.C. curves from the Hume & Irwin experiments 
were symmetrical. By inspection they could be closely approx­
imated by linear functions if rrobabllity-probability co­
ordinates were used., Thus, ^-obtained was computed according 
to equation 3.2.2 (assuming an underlying normal distribution).
FIGURE 7
Log ^ -obtained is plotted as a function of log 
^-optimum for 2 animals. Functions generated under different 
stimulus conditions are distinguished. The legend lists 
the difference between and S2; the standard, S^, was 


















LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS: lose B-obtained -x- log B-optiroum
Terman & Terman (1972)
Animal Intensity Intercept Slope S.E. Correlation S.E. of
Difference of Coefficient Estimate
_______ Sx — Sq_____________________ Slope________________________
R15A -3db -.036 .454 .014 .999 .02
-5db -.043 .608 .013 .999 .02
-lOdb -.177 .876 .046 .996 .09
R7A -3db -.009 .213 .054 .890 .079
-5db -.054 .312 .058 .938 .084
-lOdb -.107 .735 .074 .980 .109
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Data were taken from a plot of the probabilities of correct 
detections and false alarms (Pier. 2, Hume & Irwin 1974) and 
were accurate to approximately ± .02. No attempt was made to 
reanalyze data which involved response -probabilities greater 
than .98 or less than .02.
Values of ^-obtained could be determined for all bias 
conditions experienced by 3 animals in the Hume & Irwin ex­
periment. The relation between log ^ -obtained and log 
p(S2 )/p(S1 ), called log B-optimum, is plotted for these animals 
in Figure 8. Separate functions were plotted for different 
stimulus conditions. For one animal the slope of the J3-J3 
function clearly decreased when the discriminability of the 
stimuli decreased. The slopes of the bias functions obtained 
under different stimulus conditions did not differ for the 
other two animals. There is some indication, therefore, that 
bias functions have more shallow slopes under less discriminable 
conditions although the difference in slope is not as consistent 
as the interaction evident in Terman & Terman's (1972) ex­
periment. The greater slope difference in Terman & Terman's 
experiment misrht have been due to an order effect, fewer trials 
per condition, or both.
A third experiment suggested that functions relating 
^-obtained to an outcome variable were not independent of 
stimulus conditions. In an earlier study (Whittaker, in prep). 
the author used a two alternative signal detection procedure 
similar to the one used in the present experiment. Delay of 
reinforcement for correct detections was varied and jB-optimum
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FIGURE 8
Log ^ -obtained is plotted as a function of log 
J3-optimum for 3 animals. Functions generated under different 
stimulus conditions are distinguished. The legend lists the 
difference between S-^ and S£; the standard, S^, was always 
69 db. Data are from Hume & Irwin (1974).
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was computed as log ^22^11 ,/rtiere i anci D22 were the delay of 
reinforcement for correct detections and correct rejections, 
respectively. The bias index, ^-obtained, was computed 
according to procedures used in this experiment (equation 2.2.2). 
For one animal the relation between /3-obtained and /3-optimum 
had a more shallow slope under less discriminable conditions.
For the other animals whose discrimination accuracy changed 
when stimulus conditions changed, the slopes did not sig­
nificantly differ.
These experiments are currently the only signal de­
tection experiments with animals having a sufficient number 
of bias conditions to define functions relating ^-obtained to 
/3-optimum under more than one stimulus condition. In all of 
these experiments, for at least one subject the 3lope of the 
bias functions clearly depended on stimulus conditions. When 
it occurs, the interaction between discrimination performance 
and response bias is nearly always in the same direction. Thus, 
the signal detection procedure did not result in estimates of 
/3-obtained which were consistently independent of stimulus 
conditions. One reason for this interaction might have been 
an incorrect estimate of ^-obtained.
The likelihood ratios, ^-obtained, in Figures 6, J, 
and 8, were estimated as (z)/^Sp(z ), assuming underlying 
normal distributions of S-^  and SP of equal variance. Another 
estimate of the likelihood ratio, fsi(^)/fS2(x )> could have 
been used (McNicol, 1972). If the underlying distributions 
are normal and of equal variance both estimates of J3-obtained
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are equivalent. In experiments by Hume & Irwin (1974-) and 
Terman & Terman (1972) the R.O.C. curves were consistent with 
assumptions that S-]_ and Sg distributions are normal and of 
equal variance because R.O.C. curves obtained had unit slopes 
on probability-probability coordinates. The estimates of 
^-obtained were equivalent; however, in Figures 7 and 8 an 
interaction between stimulus conditions and ^-obtained was 
evident. Therefore, the differences in slope in Hume & Irwin's 
(1974) and Terman & Terman1s experiment were not due to incorrect 
estimates of ^-obtained. In this experiment the equal variance 
assumption could not have been validated under the more dis­
criminable condition. However, the general similarity of the 
results in this experiment with the results of other experiments 
suggests that equality of variance is not crucial. The slope 
differences, therefore, were not due to an incorrect method for 
estimating the likelihood ratio, j3-obtained.
When it occurred, this interaction between discrimination 
performance and response bias was consistent in the same direc­
tion; however, the interaction tended to be idiosyncratically 
exhibited by individuals rather than reliably across animals.
If the interaction had been reliable, an alternative detection 
model, not based on expected utility theory (e.g., Bush, Luce 
& Rose, 1964; Thomas & Legge, 1970) might have enabled an 
index of bias to be defined which was independent of stimulus 
conditions.
These alternate detection models predict that subjects 
will match response probabilities to relative probability of
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stimulus presentations, a result not found in detection ex­
periments by Hume (1974); Hume & Irwin (1974); and Terman & 
Terman, (1972). Before the appropriateness of alternative 
models can be considered, experimental conditions which affect 
the extent and reliability of the interaction between ^-obtained 
and stimulus conditions must be discovered.
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A.2 A Power Function Trnasforms Objective Probability Into
Subjective Probability 
Although the slopes of the functions which relate log 
^-obtained to log ^-optimum appeared to depend on the discrimin- 
ablllty of S-j_ and S2, the form of the function in this ex­
periment was independent of stimulus conditions. In Figure 
6 the observed relation between log ^-obtained and log 
^-optimum can be accurately described as linear; departures 
from linearity appear unsystematic and unrelated to the stim­
ulus condition.
The functions have slopes which differ from 1.0; that 
is, ^-obtained did not match ^ -optimum. The departures from 
matching indicated that the animals had not maximized the 
total number of available reinforcers in a session; in other 
words, they had not maximized expected value. By assuming that 
animals maximize subjective expected utility (rather than ex­
pected value), the objective outcome probabilities were trans­
formed into subjective probabilities. The form of the relation 
between log ^ -optimum and log JB-obtained determined the equation 
for converting objective into subjective probability.
As described more fully above, a linear relation be­
tween log ^ -obtained and losr jB-optimum when probability of an 
outcome is varied, can be expressed as;




If p'(w) = p(w)e then ^-obtained based on subjective probability
can be predicted;
(4.2.3)
Subjective -probability of an outcome, p'(w), is thus
a power transformation of objective probability of an outcome. 
The slope of the relation between log ^-obtained and log 
^-optimum is a direct estimate of the exponent, 0. The 
y-intercept, a, in equations 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 is an index of 
general preference for one alternative over the other and it 
should be independent of outcome probability; a also represents 
an animal's indifference point; that is, a = log ^-obtained when 
the expected utilities of R-j_ and R2 are equal. In this ex­
periment expected utilities of each alternative equal the 
probabilities of the outcomes because w -q  = w^j. In equation 
4.2.1, a would equal ^-obtained when p(w^2) - p(w1^).
objective probability can be rescaled into a subjective prob­
ability using the index of response bias, ^-obtained. A 
signal detection procedure can thus be used to define a sub­
jective probability scale.
By assuming that animals maximize expected utility,
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Analysis of the results of experiments reveals that 
a linear function also describes the relation between log 
^-obtained and log J3-optimum in most detection experiments 
where stimulus probability, p(Sp)/p(S^), was varied. Hume 
& Irwin reported the results of one experiment in which the 
stimulus probability was changed ^very 500 trials. The 
resultant relations between log ^-obtained and log ^ -optimum 
(Figure 6, Hume & Irwin) for all 4 animals were, by inspection, 
clearly S-shaped indicating a systematic departure from linearity. 
However, the animals may not have had a sufficient number of 
trials to accommod^se to the new bias condition. In another 
experiment in this series Hume & Irwin exposed animals to a 
p(S2 )/p(S-^ ) condition for about 5000 trials; every 500 trials 
they changed the difference in noise intensities which the 
animals were discriminating. The results of 3 animals run 
under these conditions are plotted in Figure 8. One animal's 
behavior exhibited an S-shaped relation between log ^-obtained 
and log J3-optimum; however, a linear function would better 
describe the bias functions obtained for the other two animals. 
Terman & Terman (1972) also systematically varied stimulus 
probability in a signal detection experiment with rats. For 
the two animals run the relation between log ^-obtained and 
log ^-optimum, p(S2 )/p(S1), could be closely described as 
linear (Figure 7). Thus, if animals are given sufficient 
exposure to a bias condition to insure close approximation 
to asymptotic behavior, the observed relation between log 
J9-obtained and log ^-optimum can be accurately described as 
linear.
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Green & Swets (1966) and Galanter & Holman (1967) also 
varied probability of stimulus presentation in signal detection 
experiments with humans. They reported approximately linear 
relations between log ^-obtained and log ^-optimum with slopes 
less than 1.0. Thus, when measured using signal detection 
procedures, subjective probability is a power function of 
objective probability. The form of the function does not 
depend on whether outcome probability or stimulus probability 
were varied.
The exponents of the transformation function varied from 
individual to individual within and across experiments and 
usually were less than one. This suggests that generally 
subjects underestimated programmed probabilities greater than 
.5 and overestimated probabilities less than .5; however, some 
animals significantly overestimated programmed probabilities 
(see RIO in Figure 6 and A-IV in Figure 8). In another ex­
periment, not a signal detection procedure, Tversky (1967) 
also found that human subjects usually underestimated values of 
objective probability greater than .5 and overestimated lower 
probabilities with a few exceptions. Subjective probability 
does not match objective probability. Rather, subjective 
■probability can be generally described as a power function 
of objective probability; however, the exponent is an in­
dividual difference which must be specified in order to pre­
dict choice behavior in other situations.
4.3 Subjective Probability As a Unique Continuum
Although a scale of subjective probability can be 
defined, it is not necessarily meaningful. A scale is mean­
ingful, in an empirical sense, to the extent that numerals are 
uniquely representative of certain experimental conditions 
(Suppes & Zinnes, 1963). If ^-obtained and subjective probability 
were meaningful scales of objective probability at an interval 
level, then successive intervals between scale values would 
represent a particular series of intervals on the objective prob­
ability scale. If p-obtained were not meaningful beyond the 
ordinal level then only the rank ordering of ^-obtained rather 
than a particular function form relating ^ -obtained to ob­
jective probability could be stated. The reproducibility of 
a particular form of the bias functions across diverse experiments 
convincingly succgest that ^-obtained is an interval scale.
Additivity is another test for an interval scale. If 
two intervals, x-y and y-z could be separately defined and 
x, y and z are numerals on an interval scale, then (x-y) +
(y-z ) - x-z (Coombs et al. , 1970). In Hobson's (1970) experiment, 
outcome probability and amount were scaled in terms of J3-obtained 
(see introduction) and thus a change in ^-obtained (from the 
animal's indifference point a) were separately defined for 
a particular outcome probability and for a particular amount.
The additive effect of two intervals were accurately predicted 
in a successive condition for three separate combinations of 
probability and amount. In condition 15 of the present ex-
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periment the additive effects of a stimulus probability, p(S2)/ 
p(S1 ), of .67 and an outcome probability, p(w22 )/p(w11), of 
.67 were predicted. Although there was more variation be­
tween predicted and obtained values of ^-obtained in this 
experiment than in Hobson's experiment, the systematic de­
partures were small. Indeed the averace value of J3-obtained 
(across animals) in condition 15 where both stimulus and out­
come probabilities were .67 was exactly twice {200%) the 
distance from the average indifference point, a, than ^ -obtained 
in condition 14 when only the stimulus probability was .67.
Existinsc evidence supnorts the contention that -^obtained 
and subjective probability are interval scales; however, if the 
scale is meaningful then a particular interval, for exatrrole,
.30 - .40, must correspond to a unique interval on the objective 
probability continuum, for example .25 - .33. ’if the scale 
parameters are related to variables other than outcome prob­
ability, more than one rule for converting objective probability 
into subjective probability would exist. If 0, the parameter in 
the transformation rule, had a higher value under a more dis­
criminable stimulus condition then, continuing the above example, 
the subjective probability interval of . 30 - .40 might correspond 
to the objective probability interval of .33 - .45. Thus there 
would be more than one interval on the objective probability 
scale for one interval on the subjective probability scale.
The subjective probability scale would be ambiguous or, in 
the strict sense, as outlined by Suppes & Zinnes (1963) not 
meaningful. Accordingly, it is important that the subjective 
probability scale remain orthogonal to other variables.
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Two variables were systematically studied to test for 
possible interactions; stimulus variables and the type of un­
certain event. Stimulus conditions did appear to affect the 
estimate of the subjective probability scale for some individuals 
in this and other experiments. Further refinement of the 
signal detection procedures to eliminate this Interaction is a 
necessary next step in the development of signal detection 
procedures for scaling utility and subjective probability.
The subjective probability function might also be de­
pendent on the type of uncertain event, in which case, a sub­
jective probability scale of a stimulus would differ from the
subjective probability of an outcome. When he introduced the 
notion of objective probability into modern utility theory,
Savage (1954) defined subjective probability as a continuum 
orthogonal to utility. Thus, the effects of varying the prob­
ability of an event should not interact with variations in 
utility. The independence of subjective probability from
variations in utility implies that the same subjective prob­
ability scale should be obtained in a detection situation
regardless of the value of an outcome. Instead of water re­
inforcement, the animals could have been reinforced in the
present experiment with food pellets or brain stimulation v/ith 
no effect on the derived subjective probability scales. Like­
wise, variations in stimulus probability and outcome probability 
should result in the same rule for transforming objective into
subjective probability; otherwise, the subjective probability 
scale would not be meaningful across variations in the type of
uncertain event. The application of expected utility theory
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(including subjective probability) to signal detection thus 
implied that subjective probabilities,p'(w) andp'(S) are 
equivalent and thatp'(w), defined by varying outcomes, could 
also be the scale of subjective probability of stimulus events, 
p *(S ), Comparisons between the results of the present experiment 
and other experiments in which stimulus probability were varied 
showed no consistent difference between subjective probability 
scales derived by varying stimulus probability and outcome 
probability (see section 2.2). In addition, ^-obtained was 
predicted with reasonable accuracy in condition 14 when the ' 
probability of a bright light, p(S1), was set to .4. The ratio 
of stimulus probabilities was converted into subjective prob­
ability according to a power function. Parameters of this 
transformation function were determined for individuals by 
varying outcome probabilities in previous conditions. Thus a 
scale of subjective probability derived by varying outcomes 
was used with moderate success to transform objective stimulus 
probabilities into subjective probability. Condition 14, 
however, was not a very sensitive test. A more powerful test 
would involve, for an individual animal, first deriving a scale 
of subjective probability by varying outcome probability, and 
secondly, deriving a scale of subjective probability by varyipg 
stimulus probability. The resultant functions for converting 
objective into subjective probabilities should be the same.
Although additional experiments are needed, existing 
evidence, from this experiment and other experiments provides a 
firm empirical foundation for Savage's (1954) assumption that 
subjective probability is a separately definable continuum.
4.4 Summary
The present experiment was intended to determine if 
signal detection procedures could be used to scale subjective 
probability. A method was derived from expected utility theory 
to define a subjective probability continuum using ^ -obtained, 
the index of response bias. As a measure of the effects of 
biasing variables, ^-obtained exhibited properties of an in­
terval scale and thus subjective probability, as defined by 
^-obtained, would have properties of an interval scale. Sub­
jective probability of either a stimulus event or outcome is 
a power function of the objective (i.e., programmed) prob­
ability with exponents that vary across individuals and have 
exponents which are, for some, greater than 1 and for others 
less than 1. Comparisons across stimulus conditions within 
the present experiment and across other signal detection ex­
periments differing along many dimensions indicate that al­
though further refinement of the signal detection procedure is 
needed, the detection procedure can produce a separately de­
finable subjective probability scale. These findings encourage 
further use of detection procedures for scaling outcome di­
mensions such as reinforcement delay or amount in terms of 
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